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## Risk assessment

### Northpointe Racial inequality

Julia Angwin,Jeff Larson,Lauren Kirchner,Surya Mattu, 5-23-2016, "Machine Bias — ProPublica," ProPublica, <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing> [Northpointe’s core product is a set of scores derived from [137 questions](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html) that are either answered by defendants or pulled from criminal records. Race is not one of the questions. The survey asks defendants such things as: “Was one of your parents ever sent to jail or prison?” “How many of your friends/acquaintances are taking drugs illegally?” and “How often did you get in fights while at school?” The questionnaire also asks people to agree or disagree with statements such as “A hungry person has a right to steal” and “If people make me angry or lose my temper, I can be dangerous.”

The appeal of risk scores is obvious: The United States locks up far more people than any other country, a disproportionate number of them black. For more than two centuries, the key decisions in the legal process, from pretrial release to sentencing to parole, have been in the hands of human beings guided by their instincts and personal biases.

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**The formula was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as white defendants.**

**White defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often than black defendants.**

Could this disparity be explained by defendants’ prior crimes or the type of crimes they were arrested for? No. **We ran a statistical test that isolated the effect of race from criminal history and recidivism, as well as from defendants’ age and gender. Black defendants were still 77 percent more likely to be pegged as at higher risk of committing a future violent crime and 45 percent more likely to be predicted to commit a future crime of any kind.** The algorithm used to create the Florida risk scores is a product of a for-profit company, Northpointe. The company disputes our analysis.

### Prediction Fails Differently for Black Defendants

Julia Angwin,Jeff Larson,Lauren Kirchner,Surya Mattu, 5-23-2016, "Machine Bias — ProPublica," ProPublica, <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing> [Northpointe’s core product is a set of scores derived from [137 questions](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **WHITE** | **AFRICAN AMERICAN** |
| Labeled Higher Risk, But Didn’t Re-Offend | 23.5% | 44.9% |
| Labeled Lower Risk, Yet Did Re-Offend | 47.7% | 28.0% |

Overall, Northpointe’s assessment tool correctly predicts recidivism 61 percent of the time. But blacks are almost twice as likely as whites to be labeled a higher risk but not actually re-offend. It makes the opposite mistake among whites: They are much more likely than blacks to be labeled lower risk but go on to commit other crimes. (Source: ProPublica analysis of data from Broward County, Fla.)

## Dirty data

### Rhetoric- Cyril

Jack Smith, 11-9-2015, "'Minority Report' Is Real — And It's Really Reporting Minorities," Mic, https://www.mic.com/articles/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policing-technology-is-really-reporting-minorities

Malkia Cyril is the executive director of the Center for Media Justice, a grassroots network of activist organizations concerned with racial inequality as it relates to tech — how **technology is often touted as a tool for democracy and justice, but can, in practice, be a tool for the redistribution of power and wealth.**

Cyril knows that there are hotspots for her hometown of Oakland, California. She wants to see them, and she's not the only one in her community. But a lack of transparency means a lack of equity to Cyril.

**[Malkia Cyril, the executive director of the Center for Media Justice,] says"The data itself doesn't remove the bias, it only exacerbates it, and reproduces the inequality that gave you the data in the first place," she said.**

**"One hundred percent of the time, the suggested intervention at a hotspot is more police,** and there's a lack of imagination or interest in any other possible approach," Cyril told *Mic*. "**It gives police a one-dimensional view of what's happening in a community."**

She says that in other hands, predictive maps could be a more empathetic, effective guideline for other kinds of services: social services, community assistance, job training — things that are proven to reduce crime in a community without police intervention.

**"People keep turning to technology like it's a savior," Cyril said. "But you can't insert technology into inequality and expect it not to produce inequality."**

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### Rhetoric- Crawford

Karen Hao, 2-13-2019, "Police across the US are training crime-predicting AIs on falsified data," MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612957/predictive-policing-algorithms-ai-crime-dirty-data/

“Your system is only as good as the data that you use to train it on,” says Kate Crawford, cofounder and co-director of AI Now and an author on the study. “If the data itself is incorrect, it will cause more police resources to be focused on the same over-surveilled and often racially targeted communities. So what you’ve done is actually a type of tech-washing where people who use these systems assume that they are somehow more neutral or objective, but in actual fact they have ingrained a form of unconstitutionality or illegality.”

### CPD uses arrests, not convictions

Dj Pangburn, 2-27-2019, "How “dirty data” from civil rights violations leads to bad predictive policing," Fast Company, https://www.fastcompany.com/90312369/how-dirty-data-from-civil-rights-violations-leads-to-bad-predictive-policing

But the ACLU wasn’t alone in its findings about CPD data policies. **A yearlong U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation into [Chicago Police Department]** the fatal shooting of Laquan McDonald **found a pattern of poor data collection to identify and address unlawful conduct,** among other issues. All the while, **CPD had been using its own predictive policing system**, which has existed in some form since at least 2012. Funded by a DOJ grant and developed by the Illinois Institute of Technology, **the Strategic Subject List (SSL)** is an automated assessment tool that uses a number of data sets to analyze crime, as well as **[which can] identify and rank individuals as at risk of becoming a victim or offender in a shooting or homicide. A 2017 Freedom of Information Act request revealed that the data set included 398,684 individuals, with much of the information having to do with arrests, not convictions–just one of many types of information that can warp SSL’s automated assessments.**

### Chicago/New Orleans/Maricopa County dirty data

[Rashida Richardson](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=3361828) (AI Now Institute), [Jason Schultz](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=654538) (New York University School of Law), [Kate Crawford](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1713766) (AI Now Institute); Microsoft Research, 2-13-2019, "Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice by Rashida Richardson, Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford :: SSRN," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3333423

**Law enforcement agencies are increasingly using predictive policing systems to forecast criminal activity and allocate police resources. Yet in numerous jurisdictions, these systems are built on data produced during documented periods of flawed, racially biased, and sometimes unlawful practices and policies** (“dirty policing”). These policing practices and policies **[which] shape the environment and the methodology by which data is created,** which raises the risk of **creating inaccurate, skewed, or systemically biased data (“dirty data”). If predictive policing systems are informed by such data, they cannot escape the legacies of the unlawful or biased policing practices that they are built on.** Nor do current claims by predictive policing vendors provide sufficient assurances that their systems adequately mitigate or segregate this data. In our research, **we analyze thirteen jurisdictions** that have used or developed predictive policing tools while under government commission investigations or federal court monitored settlements, consent decrees, or memoranda of agreement stemming from corrupt, racially biased, or otherwise illegal policing practices. In particular, we **[to] examine the link between unlawful and biased police practices and the data available to train or implement these systems. We highlight three case studies: (1) Chicago, an example of where dirty data was ingested directly into the city’s predictive system; (2) New Orleans,** an example **where the extensive evidence of dirty policing practices and recent litigation suggests an extremely high risk that dirty data was** or could be **used in predictive policing; and (3) Maricopa County, where** despite extensive evidence of dirty policing practices, **a lack of public transparency** about the details of various predictive policing systems **restricts a proper assessment of the risks.** The implications of these findings have widespread ramifications for predictive policing writ large. **Deploying predictive policing systems in jurisdictions with extensive histories of unlawful police practices presents elevated risks that dirty data will lead to flawed or unlawful predictions, which in turn risk perpetuating additional harm via feedback loops throughout the criminal justice system.** The use of predictive policing must be treated with high levels of caution and mechanisms for the public to know, assess, and reject such systems are imperative.

Jade Mcclain-Nyu, MARCH 8TH, 2019, "With 'dirty data,' predictive policing can make bias worse," Futurity, <https://www.futurity.org/predictive-policing-data-2003012-2/> [For the paper, available on [SSRN](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3333423), researchers used case study data from Chicago, New Orleans, and Arizona’s Maricopa County. (1) Chicago, an example of where dirty data was ingested directly into the city’s predictive system; (2) New Orleans, an example where the extensive evidence of dirty policing practices and recent litigation suggests an extremely high risk that dirty data was or could be used in predictive policing; and (3) Maricopa County, where despite extensive evidence of dirty policing practices, a lack of public transparency about the details of various predictive policing systems restricts a proper assessment of the risks. ]

“We chose these sites because we found an overlap between extensively documented evidence of corrupt or unlawful police practices and significant interest, development, and current or prior use of predictive policing systems,” says Jason Schultz, a professor of clinical law at New York University and one of the paper’s coauthors. “This led us to examine the risks that one would influence the other.”

**Researchers identified 13 jurisdictions** (including the aforementioned case studies) **with documented instances of unlawful or biased police practices** that have also explored or deployed **[while employing] predictive policing systems** during the periods of unlawful activity.The Chicago Police Department, for example, was under federal investigation for unlawful police practices when it implemented a computerized system that identifies people at risk of becoming a victim or offender in a shooting or homicide. **The study showed that the same demographic of residents the Department of Justice identified as targets of Chicago [Police Department]’s policing bias overlapped with those the predictive system identified.** Other examples showed significant risks of overlap but because government use of predictive policing systems is often secret and hidden from public oversight, the extent of the risks remains unknown, according to the study.**“In jurisdictions that have well-established histories of corrupt police practices, there is a substantial risk that data generated from such practices could corrupt predictive computational systems.** In such circumstances, robust public oversight and accountability are essential,” [**Jason Schultz, a professor of clinical law at New York University]** Schultz **says.**

Karen Hao, 2-13-2019, "Police across the US are training crime-predicting AIs on falsified data," MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612957/predictive-policing-algorithms-ai-crime-dirty-data/

The researchers examined 13 jurisdictions, focusing on those that have used predictive policing systems and been subject to a government-commissioned investigation. The latter requirement ensured that the policing practices had legally verifiable documentation. In nine of the jurisdictions, they found strong evidence that the systems had been trained on “dirty data.”

The problem wasn’t just data skewed by disproportionate targeting of minorities, as in New Orleans. In some cases, police departments had a culture of purposely manipulating or falsifying data under intense political pressure to bring down official crime rates. In New York, for example, in order to artificially deflate crime statistics, precinct commanders regularly asked victims at crime scenes not to file complaints. Some police officers even planted drugs on innocent people to meet their quotas for arrests. In modern-day predictive policing systems, which rely on machine learning to forecast crime, those corrupted data points become legitimate predictors.

The paper’s findings call the validity of predictive policing systems into question. Vendors of such software often argue that the biased outcomes of their tools are easily fixable, says Rashida Richardson, the director of policy research at AI Now and lead author on the study. “But in all of these instances, there is some type of systemic problem that is reflected in the data,” she says. The remedy, therefore, would require far more than simply removing one or two instances of bad behavior. It’s not so easy to “segregate out good data from bad data or good cops from bad cops,” adds Jason Schultz, the institute’s research lead for law and policy, another author on the study.

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### Return to overpoliced communities

Kristian Lum, 10-10-2016, "Predictive Policing Reinforces Police Bias," HRDAG - Human Rights Data Analysis Group, https://hrdag.org/2016/10/10/predictive-policing-reinforces-police-bias/

**Using public health data on the demographics of drug users combined with high resolution US Census data, we estimate the number of drug users residing in each location throughout the city of Oakland.** If we assume that drug users commit drug crimes where they live, then our estimates suggest that the kinds of drug crime recorded in a few specific neighborhoods in Oakland are, in fact, occurring in many neighborhoods throughout Oakland. **While police data suggests that drug crimes primarily occur in few locations throughout the city, public health-based estimates suggest that drug use is much more widespread.**

**If this algorithm actually had been used with the goal of predicting and preventing crime in Oakland, it would have failed. Instead of revealing insights into drug use that were previously unknown to police, it would have, instead, simply sent police back into the communities they were already over-policing.**

### 9/13 biased by illegal police practices

Tristan Greene, The Next Web, "Predictive policing is a scam that perpetuates systemic bias", February 21, 2019, <https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2019/02/21/predictive-policing-is-a-scam-that-perpetuates-systemic-bias/>

**A team of researchers from the** [**AI Now Institute**](https://ainowinstitute.org/) **recently** investigated thirteen police jurisdictions in the US that were utilizing predictive policing technology. At least nine of them “appear to have used police data generated during periods when the department was found to have engaged in various forms of unlawful and biased police practices” according to their findings. Think about that for a second. **Nine out of thirteen cop shops using AI to predict crime are likely using data biased by illegal police practices. That’s the very definition of “inherent systemic bias.”**

## Gives Police a Scapegoat

Jack Smith, 11-9-2015, "'Minority Report' Is Real — And It's Really Reporting Minorities," Mic, https://www.mic.com/articles/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policing-technology-is-really-reporting-minorities

**The worst-case scenario is that police are left off the hook for discriminatory practices. One of the benefits of claiming access to the latest, glitziest crime technology is being able to off-load responsibility of changing police practices to be more sensitive. "It gives the police a way out: 'Oh, It's not my cops that are profiling, we're going based on the data,'" said Herrmann, the former crime analysis supervisor for the NYPD. "Because it's data-driven, it can exonerate the police. But the software is going to point them to the same places they're already policing.**

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## Racially Biased

### PSN Biased

Bonita R. Gardner, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, “Separate and Unequal: F ate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Pr ough-on-Guns Program Targets Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement”, Michigan Journal of Race and Law, 2007 <https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=mjrl>

[**Project Safe Neighborhoods** was established in 2001 through support from President George W. Bush. The program expands upon strategies used in Boston's Operation Ceasefire, and in Richmond, Virginia's **Project Exile**.]

**Race-based challenges to Project Safe Neighborhoods prosecutions have generally failed in efforts to meet the** McCleskey **intent standard**. In the Project Exile Jones case, as to intent to discriminate, the court found that fairly strong evidence suggesting discriminatory intent was insufficient. In Jones, Chad Ramon Jones, an African American, alleged that Project Exile was racially discriminatory because it targeted African Americans for prosecution and also allegedly attempted to avoid more diverse jury pools. The defense and prosecution stipulated that as many as ninety percent of defendants prosecuted under Project Exile were African American."5 Jones was initially charged in state court after police officers found a nine-millimeter pistol in his vehicle, along with marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Jones had been driving in the City of Richmond with two passengers in his vehicle when a Richmond deputy sheriff observed Jones driving in the wrong direction on a one-way street. The officer stopped Jones.1 6 During the stop, the police officer determined that Jones' driver's license was suspended. Jones' felon-in-possession case was dismissed in state court and charges were brought in federal court. In addition to arguing selective prosecution, Jones alleged that his case was moved to federal court to avoid a Richmond jury. If Jones' state case had proceeded in the City of Richmond, he would have drawn jurors from a pool made up of approximately seventy-five percent African Americans. A jury pool for the federal district in the Eastern District of Virginia was approximately ten percent African American. Jones alleged that the charges in federal court were based in part on the efforts by prosecutors to avoid an African American jury. As proof, he offered evidence of statements by an Assistant United States Attorney from the Eastern District ofVirginia "that one [of the] goal[s] of Project Exile was to avoid 'Richmond juries' . However, the court concluded that the only evidence suggesting racial animus-the federal prosecutor's statement about "Richmond juries"-could be interpreted in more than one way and "given a less nefarious construction.' 128 The court said that the comment could have simply meant that a Richmond jury would be bound by state law, or "endowed ... with the ability to recommend a term of imprisonment above which a judge may not sentence a defendant.' 21 9 The court went on to say that "[c]onsidering that '[n]o latitude of intention should be indulged in a case like this,' ... and taking into account the presumption of regularity afforded prosecutorial discretion, the Court is unwilling to ascribe an unconstitutional intent to those responsible for Project Exile absent clear evidence of a racially discriminatory intent.' " Accordingly, the statement by the assistant U.S. Attorney was deemed insufficient to prove discriminatory intent. Such has been the fate of subsequent challenges to Project Exile and its progeny, Project Safe Neighborhoods. **Shortly after Jones was decided, the Western District of New York issued an opinion addressing a claim that Project Exile as enforced in Rochester, New York, was discriminatory. In United States v. Grimes, the court held that Grimes' evidence showing that twenty seven out of thirty three defendants prosecuted under Project Exile were African American failed to state a claim for selective prosecution.** The court cited Grimes' lack of evidence that there were White defendants similarly situated who were not prosecuted, and noted that there was no showing of discriminatory intent. Under a separate disparate impact analysis, the court considered Grimes' claim that the geographic focus on the City of Rochester by the Western District of New York, in effect targeted African Americans. Without concluding as to whether Grimes showed a disparate impact, the court rejected Grimes' claim because there was no evidence of racial animus or disparate treatment.12 **More recently,** the **[in] several prosecutions under Project Safe Neighborhoods** in the Eastern District of Michigan have withstood challenges on equal protection grounds. 133 In March 2006, the Sixth Circuit rejected a challenge to Project Safe Neighborhoods on equal protection grounds in the case United States v. Henderson.13 Henderson was charged in federal court under Project Safe Neighborhoods. He argued that his prosecution under the program was unconstitutionally race-based because prosecutors target minorities by focusing on a geographic location with a high minority population. Although not specifically referred to by the court in the Henderson decision, as noted, **evidence has been presented in numerous cases in the Eastern District of Michigan that eighty-nine percent of the prosecutions in that district were against African Americans.**135 Nevertheless, in dicta, the Sixth Circuit noted that because there was "no record evidence that would tend to show either discriminatory intent or effect on the part of the government's prosecution of Henderson, '' 1 36 Henderson had failed to state a claim for selective prosecution. According to the Court, a selective prosecution claim cannot be supported by proof short of evidence that prosecutors intended to discriminate. Yet, this is difficult to prove; it is impossible to get into the heads of prosecutors and show bad intent. What may be shown, however, is that prosecutors knowingly act with an uneven hand. In Yick Wo the Court noted that the administrators acting against Yick Wo acted with "an evil eye and an uneven hand., 137 Subsequent courts have assumed that the "evil eye" is as necessary as the "uneven hand" in proving discrimination. Should equal protection require such? To consider this question, it is necessary to examine the possible goals of equal protection laws.

### Predpol Ineffective in Louisiana, Richmond, Alhambra, and Santa Cruz

Darwin Bondgraham, 6-24-2015, "Oakland Mayor Schaaf and Police Seek Unproven 'Predictive Policing' Software," East Bay Express, https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/oakland-mayor-schaaf-and-police-seek-unproven-predictive-policing-software/Content?oid=4362343

**It's not clear, however, whether PredPol's product actually works.** There have been no independent analyses of PredPol's software. The peer-reviewed research on the specific statistical methods the company uses to predict crime were conducted by Jeffery Brantingham and George Mohler, both of whom have financial stakes in PredPol.

**A RAND study from last year that analyzed** a similar effort to predict locations **where property crimes were more likely to occur in** Shreveport, **Louisiana concluded that the program, "did not generate a statistically significant reduction in property crime."**

PredPol claims on its website that its software is "scientifically proven." The company points to dramatic crime reductions in the cities where its software has been used by the police as proof. But when the Express asked PredPol for citations of independent studies supporting its claims, it provided none.

**The Richmond Police Department signed a three-year contract with Predpol** in May 2013, and worked with the company to incorporate its crime predictions into RPD's patrol tactics. **PredPol took credit for subsequent crime reductions in Richmond**, stating on its website that "as of March 1, 2014, the Richmond, CA Police Department saw a 21% drop in violent crime, a 28% decrease in property crime, a 50% drop in residential burglaries and a 34% decrease in vehicle theft as compared to the same period last year." When asked about the source of these statistics, Ben Hoehn, a marketing manager for PredPol, wrote in an email to me that they were from the Richmond Police Department's online newsletter authored by **[But] Police Chief Chris Magnus [said].**

**"In Richmond crime went down, yes, but now it's going back up,"** Magnus said in an interview. **"We're seeing double digit increases."**

**Magnus said** PredPol's team worked hard with the city, but that **he isn't convinced the software helped reduce crime. "We're not going to continue it," said Magnus, about the city's contract with PredPol**, which runs through May of next year. "Our plan going forward is to rely less on predictive policing and more on what we learn through our crime analysis process and through the beat officers' familiarity with the areas they're assigned."

PredPol was founded by mathematicians who, while conducting research for the US military, took statistical models used to predict earthquakes and turned them into algorithms designed to track enemy combatants and civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to US Army Research Office records. About five years ago, the same researchers, including UCLA professor Jeffery Brantingham and Santa Clara University professor George Mohler, began modifying their statistical models in an attempt to map and predict crime in Los Angeles for LAPD. After the partnership with LAPD ended, Brantingham and Mohler teamed up with a group of Silicon Valley investors and lobbyists to found PredPol. Since then, PredPol has garnered several million of dollars in investment funds, and sold subscriptions to its cloud-based software to cities including Richmond, Seattle, and Atlanta.

The software maps out 500-by-500-square-foot boxes, identifying them as locations where robberies, auto thefts, and other crimes are supposedly more likely to happen. The predictions are based on historic crime statistics that are run through a secret, proprietary algorithm. Using these maps, police step up their patrols in specific locations to catch, and ultimately prevent crimes, according to PredPol.

"We are intentionally not in the business of predicting who is most likely to commit crimes," Hoehn told the Express in an email. "Our methodology uses only three pieces of data for predictions: the type of crime, the place of crime, and the time crime occurred — generally public information and certainly not personally identifying or private information."

**PredPol's website also claims credit for crime reductions in** other cities. The **Alhambra, California** police "reported a 32% drop in burglaries and a 20% drop in vehicle theft since deploying [PredPol's software] in January 2013," and that "[t]he city reported its lowest month of crime in history in May 2014." However, the blurb does not explain over what time period burglaries and vehicle thefts dropped by those amounts. Similarly, PredPol claims that the city of **[and] Santa Cruz** "saw assaults drop by 9%, burglaries decrease by 11%, and robberies down 27% in its first year using the software (2011-2012)."

**But a closer look at crime statistics in both cities reveals no significant reductions in violent crime and property crime since PredPol's software was put into use by police. In fact, in Alhambra, total crime has increased slightly since 2013 when the police began using PredPol's crime prediction maps**, according to data posted online by the city.

**The total number of crimes logged by the Santa Cruz police** in 2011, when the police began using PredPol, was significantly above the city's ten-year average. Last year, **after three years of using PredPol to predict crime**, the city's total number of reported crimes **remained significantly above the ten-year average.** The total number assaults dropped by about 9 percent between 2011 and 2012, as PredPol claims, and they declined again the next year by about 9 percent, but **in 2014 assaults shot upward by 24 percent, well above the average number over the ten previous years.** Furthermore, in prior years, there were much more significant declines in assaults and other crimes, despite the fact that this was before the Santa Cruz police were using PredPol. The drops in specific types of crime in both cities appear to be just random fluctuations.

"PredPol is a plug-and-play solution for agencies looking for an easy fix," said a lieutenant at a mid-sized police agency who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the officer was not authorized to make public statements. The lieutenant, who heads a crime analysis team, said PredPol has cherry-picked statistics to make its product look effective.

### Predpol cherry picks data to boast

Darwin Bondgraham, 6-24-2015, "Oakland Mayor Schaaf and Police Seek Unproven 'Predictive Policing' Software," East Bay Express, https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/oakland-mayor-schaaf-and-police-seek-unproven-predictive-policing-software/Content?oid=4362343

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Jack Smith, 11-9-2015, "'Minority Report' Is Real — And It's Really Reporting Minorities," Mic, https://www.mic.com/articles/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policing-technology-is-really-reporting-minorities

PredPol's Samuels says that crime reduction percentage averages around 20%, but a hard look at the numbers self-reported by PredPol don't paint a clear enough portrait of PredPol's alleged success. An [analysis of the data](https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131031/13033125091/predictive-policing-company-uses-bad-stats-contractually-obligated-shills-to-tout-unproven-successes.shtml) by *Techdirt* shows how PredPol routinely cherry-picks data for its [exhaustive roster](http://www.predpol.com/results/) of success stories — a dissonance augmented by the fact that PredPol requires many police departments to participate in marketing drives and PR initiatives.

### Predpol feedback loop, overpolicing

Jack Smith, 10-9-2016, "(Exclusive) Crime-prediction tool PredPol amplifies racially biased policing, study shows," Mic, <https://www.mic.com/articles/156286/crime-prediction-tool-pred-pol-only-amplifies-racially-biased-policing-study-shows#.DZeqQ4LYs>

**Because PredPol's algorithm uses reported crime and arrests to generate a heat map — as opposed to where crime actually occurs — its recommendations can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. When officers are dispatched to neighborhoods where police already make a lot of arrests,** they make even more, creating a feedback loop. In a second experiment, Isaac and Lum hypothesized that sending police to neighborhoods chosen by the algorithm would lead to a jump in reported crime by 20%. The researchers fed that 20% increase in arrests back into the algorithm. The algorithm became orders of magnitude more confident that its predictions were correct.

"If police go there **and find more crime, it creates a feedback loop, and the algorithm becomes more certain about these places that are over-policed**," Lum said.


### Predpol is inaccurate and targets minority communities

Jack Smith, 10-9-2016, "(Exclusive) Crime-prediction tool PredPol amplifies racially biased policing, study shows," Mic, <https://www.mic.com/articles/156286/crime-prediction-tool-pred-pol-only-amplifies-racially-biased-policing-study-shows#.DZeqQ4LYs>

**Using** a publicly-available version of **PredPol's algorithm, researchers Isaac and Kristian Lum used 2010 reported crime data from Oakland to predict where crimes would occur in 2011**. To compare that map with what's actually going down in Oakland, researchers used **[and compared that to actual] data from the Census and the National Crime Victimization Survey** to create a heat map showing where drug use in the city was most prevalent in 2011. **In an ideal world, the maps would be similar. But in fact, PredPol directed police to black neighborhoods** like West Oakland and International Boulevard **instead of zeroing in on where drug crime actually occurred. Predominantly white neighborhoods** like Rockridge and Piedmont **got a pass, even though white people use illicit drugs at higher rates than minorities. To see how actual police practices in Oakland matched up with PredPol's recommendations, researchers also compared PredPol's map to a map of where Oakland Police arrested people for drug crimes. The maps were strikingly similar.** Regardless of where crime is happening, predominantly black neighborhoods have about 200 times more drug arrests than other Oakland neighborhoods. **In other words, police in Oakland are already doing what PredPol's map suggested — over-policing black neighborhoods — rather than zeroing in on where drug crime is happening.**

"If you were to look at the data and where they're finding drug crime, it's not the same thing as where the drug crime actually is," Lum said in an interview. **"Drug crime is everywhere, but police only find it where they're looking."**

To be clear, Oakland does not currently use PredPol — researchers merely used Oakland as an example of what happens when you apply PredPol to a major metropolitan area. Dozens of other U.S. cities, however, do. It is a [staple](http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/02/11/predpol-predictive-policing/) of policing in Los Angeles, which has the second-largest department in the country after New York City. Across the nation, PredPol is deciding what neighborhoods and city blocks officers prioritize when they make their rounds.



### Predictive Policing targets black/Latino communities

Mark Puente, Los Angeles Times, 4-11-2019, "LAPD Predictive Policing Tool Raises Racial Bias Concerns," No Publication, https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/LAPD-Predictive-Policing-Tool-Raises-Racial-Bias-Concerns.html

**The action came as so-called predictive policing— using search tools, point scores and other methods — is under increasing scrutiny by privacy and civil liberties groups that say the tactics result in heavier policing of black and Latino communities. The argument was underscored at Tuesday’s commission meeting when several UCLA academics cast doubt on the research behind crime modeling and predictive policing.**

### COMPAS falsely flags minority groups more

Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Lauren Kirchner, Surya Mattu, ProPublica, "Machine Bias — ProPublica", May 23, 2016, <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing>

Predictive models incorrectly flag black defendants who will not re-offend more often than they do for white defendants. In what is the most widely cited piece on bias in predictive policing, ProPublica reports **the nationally used COMPAS model** (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) **falsely flags white defendants at a rate of 23.5 percent and black defendants at 44.9 percent.** In other words, black defendants who don’t deserve it are erroneously flagged almost twice as much as undeserving whites.

## Impossible to ‘clean’ dirty data

Julia Angwin,Jeff Larson,Lauren Kirchner,Surya Mattu, 5-23-2016, "Machine Bias — ProPublica," ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

Brennan said it is difficult to construct a score that doesn’t include items that can be correlated with race — such as poverty, joblessness and social marginalization. “If those are omitted from your risk assessment, accuracy goes down,” he said.

## MISC

### AT PSN: The decrease in crime is due to social services, which can be used in the aff world as well

United States Attorney Offices "Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)," No Publication, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/PSN

In keeping with the Attorney General’s mission to reduce violent crime, the Northern District of Georgia’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) program focuses on prosecuting those individuals who most significantly drive violence in our communities, and supports and fosters partnerships between law enforcement and schools, the faith community, and local community leaders to prevent and deter future criminal conduct.

## Enforcement Actions

PSN is working in partnership with local and state law enforcement to ensure that federal efforts are focused on the most violent offenders, by specifically:

* Maintaining ongoing efforts to reduce violent crime in the English Avenue neighborhood of Atlanta and by also identifying additional communities in Clayton, Henry, and Troup Counties as PSN target enforcement areas. These enhanced enforcement efforts include targeted crime prevention in neighborhood schools and focused deterrence concerning gang-affiliated offenders currently incarcerated, but pending release back into local communities; and
* Building on the success of the District’s Violent Repeat Offender (VRO) program implemented in 2012 in metro Atlanta to address persistent violent crime. The VRO initiative was expanded to include the Rome, Gainesville, and Newnan Divisions. Read more about the VRO program [here](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/criminal-division/violent-repeat-offenders-initiative).

For example, our office has prosecuted the following cases as a part of PSN's increased focus on targeting drivers within our local communities:

* [Twenty-three Ghost Face Gangsters federally indicted on RICO and other charges](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/twenty-three-ghost-face-gangsters-federally-indicted-rico-and-other-charges)
* [Crew sentenced for illegally purchasing 33 guns and trafficking them from Georgia to New York](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/crew-sentenced-illegally-purchasing-33-guns-and-trafficking-them-georgia-new-york)
* [Darknet international gun traffickers sentenced](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/darknet-international-gun-traffickers-sentenced)
* ["135 Pirus" gang members indicted on murder in aid of racketeering and other charges](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/135-pirus-gang-members-indicted-murder-aid-racketeering-and-other-charges)
* [Bank robber sentenced to 14 years in prison](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/bank-robber-sentenced-14-years-prison)
* [Armed career criminal sentenced to 25 years for violent carjacking](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/armed-career-criminal-sentenced-25-years-violent-carjacking)

## Community Partnerships

* **Our office implemented a comprehensive crime prevention and reentry strategy to complement PSN’s enforcement efforts.** Our office partnered with the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice, the Georgia Department of Corrections, and the Georgia Department of Community Supervision, **to implement a Credible Messenger initiative to intervene with high-risk juveniles and adults who will be released to PSN target enforcement areas and other areas within the District with high rates of violence.** The Credible Messenger Model utilizes individuals who can relate to and build trusting relationships with committed and incarcerated youth and adults, as well as their families. Credible Messengers are often neighborhood leaders, experienced prevention and reentry specialists, and individuals with relevant life experiences (usually including their own involvement with the criminal justice system) who coach, guide, mentor, facilitate and advocate for youth and young adults who have been imprisoned for gun-related and gang-related crime. **Overall, Credible Messenger Models demonstrate a proven track record of deterring crime, reinforcing pro-social behaviors, improving relationships between stakeholders and community members, increasing engagement with social programs and services, and fostering compliance with court mandates.**
* As a part of the PSN’s Credible Messenger initiative, Arthur Powell, founder of **EGRESS Consultants and Services, LLC**, began a six-month workshop in August 2018 with the Georgia Department of Corrections, Metro Reentry Prison, for a cohort of incarcerated male adults who have been adjudicated for gang- or gun-related activity. EGRESS teaches these individuals to employ strategies to deal with the circumstances that led them to engage in criminal activity or to join criminal street gangs.
* **Offender Alumni Association** (OAA) is a non-profit, grass-roots movement modeled after the concept of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA). OAA deploys offenders to help empower other adult offenders and their family members in actively reducing crime and restoring communities. OAA offers peer-to-peer support in strengthening family relations, community revitalization, engaging inmates behind the wall, and removing the stigma associated with being a convicted felon. In 2018, OAA established a Support Forum in Clayton County and Fulton County, as well as facilitated Support Forums inside of the Metro Reentry Facility for incarcerated individuals prior to release. To date, OAA has served more than 130 current or former incarcerated individuals, along with their families, to assist with their transition back into the community.
* **Freedom** is a Choice, Inc. is an organization that mentors engage high-risk, high-needs youth in PSN communities within Clayton, DeKalb, Fulton and Henry Counties. These mentors schedule weekly contacts with mentees and engage in monthly group mentoring sessions that utilize the Forward Thinking Interactive Journal Series, a cognitive-behavioral evidence-based strategy that assists justice-involved youth in making positive changes to their thoughts, feelings and behaviors.

### Predpol lack of transparency

Jack Smith, 10-9-2016, "(Exclusive) Crime-prediction tool PredPol amplifies racially biased policing, study shows," Mic, https://www.mic.com/articles/156286/crime-prediction-tool-pred-pol-only-amplifies-racially-biased-policing-study-shows#.DZeqQ4LYs

To evaluate the fairness and efficacy of predictive crime algorithms, they would need to be audited by outside parties. But most predictive police technology exists in a black box of private sector trade secrets; systems that should be up for public scrutiny are outsourced to private companies like PredPol that don't have to disclose their algorithms for a public audit. The only way researchers were able to use the software in this case was to pull a version of the algorithm from one of PredPol's own, published studies.

"If predictive policing means some individuals are going to have more police involvement in their life, there needs to be a minimum of transparency," Adam Schwartz, a senior staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said in an interview "Until they do that, the public should have no confidence that the inputs and algorithms are a sound basis to predict anything."

### What COMPAS is meant to be used for

Julia Angwin,Jeff Larson,Lauren Kirchner,Surya Mattu, 5-23-2016, "Machine Bias — ProPublica," ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

Some Wisconsin counties use other risk assessment tools at arrest to determine if a defendant is too risky for pretrial release. Once a defendant is convicted of a felony anywhere in the state, the Department of Corrections attaches Northpointe’s assessment to the confidential presentence report given to judges, according to Hoy’s presentation.

In theory, judges are not supposed to give longer sentences to defendants with higher risk scores. Rather, they are supposed to use the tests primarily to determine which defendants are eligible for probation or treatment programs.

### COMPAS is used at each step in the prison system, from sentencing to parole

Julia Angwin,Jeff Larson,Lauren Kirchner,Surya Mattu, 5-23-2016, "Machine Bias — ProPublica," ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

In 2011, Brennan and Wells sold Northpointe to Toronto-based [conglomerate Constellation Software](https://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=CSU.TO) for an undisclosed sum.

Wisconsin has been among the most eager and expansive users of Northpointe’s risk assessment tool in sentencing decisions. In 2012, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections launched the use of the software throughout the state. It is used at each step in the prison system, from sentencing to parole.

In a 2012 presentation, corrections official Jared Hoy described the system as a “[giant correctional pinball machine](https://vimeo.com/60187317)” in which correctional officers could use the scores at every “decision point.”

Wisconsin has not yet completed a statistical validation study of the tool and has not said when one might be released. State corrections officials declined repeated requests to comment for this article.

### Northpointe=COMPAS

Julia Angwin,Jeff Larson,Lauren Kirchner,Surya Mattu, 5-23-2016, "Machine Bias — ProPublica," ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

NORTHPOINTE WAS FOUNDED in 1989 by Tim Brennan, then a professor of statistics at the University of Colorado, and Dave Wells, who was running a corrections program in Traverse City, Michigan.

Wells had built a prisoner classification system for his jail. “It was a beautiful piece of work,” Brennan said in an interview conducted before ProPublica had completed its analysis. Brennan and Wells shared a love for what Brennan called “quantitative taxonomy” — the measurement of personality traits such as intelligence, extroversion and introversion. The two decided to build a risk assessment score for the corrections industry.

Brennan wanted to improve on a leading risk assessment score, the LSI, or Level of Service Inventory, which had been developed in Canada. “I found a fair amount of weakness in the LSI,” Brennan said. He wanted a tool that addressed the major theories about the causes of crime.

Brennan and Wells named their product the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, or COMPAS. It assesses not just risk but also nearly two dozen so-called “criminogenic needs” that relate to the major theories of criminality, including “criminal personality,” “social isolation,” “substance abuse” and “residence/stability.” Defendants are ranked low, medium or high risk in each category.

## AT Morally Permissible

### Alternatives without police intervention

Jack Smith, 11-9-2015, "'Minority Report' Is Real — And It's Really Reporting Minorities," Mic, https://www.mic.com/articles/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policing-technology-is-really-reporting-minorities

**Malkia Cyril is the executive director of the Center for Media Justice, a grassroots network of activist organizations concerned with racial inequality as it relates to tech** — how technology is often touted as a tool for democracy and justice, but can, in practice, be a tool for the redistribution of power and wealth. Cyril knows that there are hotspots for her hometown of Oakland, California. She wants to see them, and she's not the only one in her community. But a lack of transparency means a lack of equity to Cyril.

"The data itself doesn't remove the bias, it only exacerbates it, and reproduces the inequality that gave you the data in the first place," she said.

"One hundred percent of the time, the suggested intervention at a hotspot is more police, and there's a lack of imagination or interest in any other possible approach," Cyril told Mic. "It gives police a one-dimensional view of what's happening in a community."

**She says that in other hands, predictive maps could be a more empathetic, effective guideline for other kinds of services: social services, community assistance, job training — things that are proven to reduce crime in a community without police intervention.**

## AT Terrorism

# Neg Ideas:

Terrorism

Reduces Crime

Public Health

Domestic Abuse

# Neg Cards

## Fights Terrorism

### Predictive AI fights terrorism and money laundering through analyzing text, cross referencing fund transfers, and social media

Scott Parker, 6-22-2018, " 3 Ways to Use Data to Fight Terrorism and Money Laundering," Nextgov, https://www.nextgov.com/ideas/2018/06/3-ways-use-data-fight-terrorism-and-money-laundering/149043/

**Cognitive search and analytics technologies** are all about accessing the right information at the right time—for people with the necessary authorization. These tools **process big data in near real time to surface patterns and relationships among disparate silos of information.** Intelligent data processing combined with machine learning enables computers to learn as they process information to deliver increasingly relevant information. These tools can further the operational efficiency of intelligence services and have the potential to exponentially increase their predictive analysis capacities. **Using these tools to become information-driven can help with the fight against terrorism, money laundering and fraud. Here are a few examples: Analyzing Text** Cognitive search and analytics tools enable data to be interpreted and similarities in topics and content to be detected, even across disparate vocabularies. They automate and accelerate the creation of networks mapping people, topics, locations, etc., while helping security services identify criminal activity. Even in the case of "lone wolves," it is possible to draw upon the traces inevitably left on the internet or the dark net to detect behavioral patterns, and thus prevent them moving toward taking action. **Cross Referencing Account, Card Numbers and Fund TransfersCognitive search and analytics technologies can also play a role in the fight against money laundering, which is one of the main sources of funding for terrorism.** Investigators must accurately identify cyber criminals, drawing upon huge amounts of data in an extremely short period of time. **Cognitive technology allows data—in particular, financial data such as account and card numbers or fund transfers—to be automatically cross-referenced in order to identify fraudulent activity.** Sparse information can be precisely detected and combined for "mapping" purposes, tracing the links between suspects and movements of capital. Cognitive search and analytics draw upon this interaction mapping to detect traces of illegal activity and track them back to the perpetrators.**Social Media Monitoring** Monitoring social networks to track organized crime is fundamental to the work of the intelligence services. They use open source intelligence, which includes all the intelligence obtained from public sources of information. **Recent terrorist attacks have shown that responsiveness is the key to effective surveillance. Monitoring social networks, discussion forums, blogs and other digital communication tools is an essential way of detecting radicalizing profiles and gaining real-time insights into potential threats.** It allows for identification of behavior posing a threat to domestic security and anticipation of future attacks. Using advanced technology that is cognitive, proven, and complete is increasingly vital for a modern intelligence service in its fight against terrorism, fraud and money laundering.

### Predictive AI can be used to fight terrorism with a variety of ways-- not just heat maps

Kathleen McKendrick, International Security Department, “Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism”, August 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-08-07-AICounterterrorism.pdf>

This section describes how the contribution of **predictive AI to countering terrorism has already been recognized** and, to a limited extent, put to use. It introduces some of the approaches and actors involved. **Automated data analytics are used to support the activities of the intelligence and security services**, particularly through data visualization. 14 **Algorithms prioritize terrorist suspects,15 and routinely assess the risk of air-travel passengers.**16 Information can be collected and stored by default, to be analysed at a later time with a view to revealing patterns and links that expose terrorist networks or suspicious activities. 17 **Machine learning approaches allow the interpretation and analysis of otherwise inaccessible patterns in large amounts of data.**18 These approaches may involve filtering, analysis of relationships between entities, or more sophisticated image- or voice- recognition tools. 19 Intelligence agencies and security services are not the only ones to both recognize and attempt to realize the predictive value of data. The result has been a devolution of methods and capabilities to civilian authorities (e.g. the police).20 **Social network analysis of urban gangs,21 citywide alert systems,22 crime-spot prediction,23 and custody decision-making aids24 are all examples of predictive tools underpinned by AI that are applicable to counterterrorism and that are already in use by law enforcement agencies. Beyond this, commercial actors are also involved, sometimes as a result of governments demanding action from communication service providers to monitor and exclude terrorist activity on their own platforms.25 Some technology companies employ a mix of human expertise and increasingly sophisticated predictive measures to monitor and disrupt terrorist activity on their platform**s.26 The future could see an increasing involvement by these kinds of technology companies in attempting to address terrorism themselves, rather than simply closing down unacceptable sites or user profiles.27 The development and use of AI in the financial services sector has been spurred by mandatory reporting of suspicious activity in financial transactions.28 Private-sector companies are also heavily involved in developing software and making datasets available for use by the public sector in the area of general law enforcement. In the case of counterterrorism, investigative approaches applied prior to an attack taking place are traditionally undertaken by the intelligence and security services. Broadly speaking, these approaches focus on working outwards from partially discovered plots or known suspects in order to find other involved parties or to identify links leading deeper into terrorist organizations.29 The granting of access to data related to a particular individual is contingent on their having a link to one or more existing investigations. Distinct from this, and **recently made plausible by developments in AI, is the analysis of all individuals’ routine activity to predict terrorist events, or to identify terrorists by distinguishing what is distinct in the activity of a specific subgroup.** The vast amount of digital information now generated by the average individual means that more of this routine activity could be understood through analysis. Sources include communications metadata and internet connection records, but also extend to location and activity tracking, purchases and social media activity. Much of this information is not in the hands of the intelligence and security services, meaning that the actors involved in exploiting it are diverse. Some narrow cases of use are described below.

### The US Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity already uses predictive policing to forecast terrorism effortsKathleen McKendrick, International Security Department, “Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism”, August 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-08-07-AICounterterrorism.pdf>

**Timing and location of attacks Large amounts of effort, particularly from the academic community, have been devoted to developing models that predict the location and timing of terrorist attacks**.30 Basic approaches have incorporated the ‘aftershock effect’, whereby the chance of another event is increased in the wake of an attack (a phenomenon also observed with crimes such as burglary) to make surprisingly accurate predictions about terrorist attacks.31 Other approaches have predicted the impact of external factors – such as political conditions – on the incidence of attacks.32 **In 2015, for instance, the technology start-up PredictifyMe claimed that its model, computing more than 170 data points, was able to predict suicide attacks with an accuracy of 72 per cent**.33 It is not possible to validate this claim, and should be noted that the start-up in question subsequently collapsed. In other instances, however, sophisticated models based on open-source information that aim to predict various other types of events have achieved prescient results. Increasingly these models incorporate open-source data generated by individuals using social media and applications on their mobile phones. One such example is **the Early Model-Based Event Recognition using Surrogates (EMBERS) system, which incorporates the results of various separate predictive models in order to forecast events such as** disease outbreaks and **civil unrest events.** The project is a collaboration between the academic and business communities and is funded by the US Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)’s Open Source Indicators Program. Among other things, inputs include RSS feeds from news websites and blogs, Twitter feeds, events pages on social networking sites and restaurant booking applications.34

The US National Security Agency works with accuracy, only falsely identifying in 0.008% of cases.

Kathleen McKendrick, International Security Department, “Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism”, August 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-08-07-AICounterterrorism.pdf>

Leaked details of **the US National Security Agency’s SKYNET**, which was purportedly used in Pakistan in 2007, are useful in illustrating how quantitative methods might predict involvements in terrorism. As reported, the algorithm **was used to analyse metadata from 55 million domestic Pakistani mobile phone users.**38 This was a machine learning model built by exposure to those data; it classified the phone users into two separate groups, one of which exhibited a usage pattern matching that of a small group of persons known to be terrorist couriers, the other comprising the remainder of the mobile phone users. **The model** was able to narrow the large population size down, and was reported to have **falsely identified individuals as potential couriers in only 0.008 per cent of cases**. It is important to note, however, that the scale of the initial dataset in relation to the total population of Pakistan (at that time approaching 200 million) implies that a false positive rate of 0.008 per cent would result in the wrongful identification of some 15,000 individuals as of interest. Furthermore, the 0.008 per cent false positive rate could only be achieved with a 50 per cent accuracy rate for identifying known couriers, meaning that half of the known couriers could be identified using the model. From these figures, it is obvious that the model used was not effective in its own right, but it shows how seemingly non-sensitive data may have predictive value when identifying close links with terrorism or likely intelligence value. These limited examples of cases of the use of predictive AI in countering terrorism hint at the possibilities, rather than providing any credible proof of concept. It is not realistic to expect AI to provide immediate solutions to complex questions. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement discovered this when attempting to use machine learning models in data mining across various internet sources to assist with the vetting of visa applicants. The pursuit of a technical solution to this task was abandoned after it became clear that no such capability was available for immediate procurement.39 In summary, there are already numerous examples of AI that predict terrorism, or aspects of terrorism. Often, the ability to develop AI tools for this purpose rests with those who have access to data, or who are custodians of it by virtue of the service they provide. Where predictive AI is useful to police forces and other authorities (such as border enforcement agencies), its development is often outsourced to the software industry. **Assuming that the trend of digitization continues, and that the performance of AI improves, there will be more scope to derive accurate predictions about terrorism from AI in future, and its uptake for counterterrorism use is likely to increase.**

Staffan Dahllof et. al found for the EU Observer on October 6, 2017 that

Staffan Dahllof et. al., EU Observer, "EU states copy Israel's 'predictive policing'", October 6, 2017, https://euobserver.com/justice/139277<https://euobserver.com/justice/139277>

**Israel's Intelligence Affairs Minister Yisrael Katz** – who also serves as a member of the security cabinet – confirmed at his office in Tel Aviv that there is a possibility some Palestinians, arrested after having been marked out by the predictive system, were not actively and fully planning to carry out an attack - and perhaps did not decide to carry out an attack at the time of their arrest. Katz **says** this may happen in "borderline cases." "**Because of the unique system that was developed and put into operation here, hundreds of cases of attacks** of this sort **have been prevented**. In the dilemma of whether or not to act – it could be that you also include borderline cases here," Katz added. **After a peak of 80 attempted attacks in October 2015, the number of attacks has since steadily declined. Since April 2016, the number of attempts has dropped to less than 20 a month, according to Israeli foreign ministry data.** "Arrests were made, terror attacks went down, that means these are the folks, no way around it. **Statistically, these are the right people. If we missed this way or that way in a few cases? The cause is deserving (the means)** – preventing terror attacks. It is not as if someone invented a way to haunt someone on Facebook," according to Katz.

Predictive policing obviously worked in Israel through preventing terrorist attacks and also causing a steep decline in the rate of these attacks. Second, Peter Waldman and others of Bloomberg reported on April 19, 2018 that

Peter Waldman et. al., Bloomberg, "Palantir Knows Everything About You", April 19, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2018-palantir-peter-thiel/>

Founded in 2004 by Peter Thiel and some fellow PayPal alumni, **Palantir** cut its teeth working for the Pentagon and the CIA in Afghanistan and Iraq. The company’s engineers and products don’t do any spying themselves; they’re more like a spy’s brain, collecting and analyzing information that’s fed in from the hands, eyes, nose, and ears. The **software combs through disparate data sources—financial documents, airline reservations, cellphone records, social media postings—and searches for connections that human analysts might miss.** It then presents the linkages in colorful, easy-to-interpret graphics that look like spider webs. U.S. spies and special forces loved it immediately; they deployed Palantir to synthesize and sort the blizzard of battlefield intelligence.It **helped** planners **avoid roadside bombs, track insurgents for assassination, even hunt down Osama bin Laden.** The military success led to federal contracts on the civilian side. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services uses Palantir to detect Medicare fraud. The FBI uses it in criminal probes. The Department of Homeland Security deploys it to screen air travelers and keep tabs on immigrants.

Predictive policing was used to track down Osama bin Laden, a man who is responsible for over 4000 deaths in terror attacks alone. How can we possibly say a system is unjust when they are bringing terrorists to justice? We are clearly seeing positive consequences coming out of predictive policing, which is why we must negate.

Kathleen McKendrick of Chatham House—a British Think Tank—noted in August 2019

Kathleen McKendrick, Chatham House, "Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism", August 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-08-07-AICounterterrorism.pdf>

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## Reduces Crime

### PSN started in 2001

Studying These, 8-14-2019, "Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)," Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/project-safe-neighborhoods-psn

The Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative was launched in 2001, and built upon the foundations of previously-existing gun crime reduction efforts such as the Clinton-era Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI), Richmond’s Project Exile, and the Boston Ceasefire program. By studying these and other efforts, the Department determined that successful gun crime reduction initiatives had three common elements: they were comprehensive, coordinated and community-based.

### PSN 2019

“Project Safe Neighborhoods, One Year Report”, March 2019, US Department of Justice <https://www.justice.gov/file/1149381/download>

Under PSN, each district has one or more target areas in which it focuses PSN’s comprehensive violence reduction efforts. Twice a year, every U.S. Attorney’s Office reports on its PSN activities and accomplishments for each target area.2 **At the conclusion of the first year of the reinvigorated PSN program, all 93 U.S. Attorney’s Offices have implemented PSN programs, which focus on 187 target areas.** Approximately 41 percent of districts have more than one target area (Figure 3).

“Project Safe Neighborhoods, One Year Report”, March 2019, US Department of Justice <https://www.justice.gov/file/1149381/download>

**Northern District of Indiana** During the first year of the revitalized PSN program, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors identified and prosecuted groups of individuals responsible for the violence in the target areas. These enforcement efforts were undertaken in tandem with community partnerships and programs to prevent additional crime through targeted outreach, call-in meetings, and social services support. In Gary, shootings are down 21 percent, homicides are down 16 percent, and total violent crime rate is down 20.5 percent, according to the FBI’s 2017 Uniform Crime Reporting data. In South Bend, shootings between the most violent groups targeted by their program decreased by 24 percent.6

**Eastern District of Kentucky** In January 2018, federal, state, and local partners created the Fayette County Violent Crime Task Force, a joint effort to combat violent crime and drug trafficking in Lexington. The Task Force was formed as part of the PSN initiative, which focuses enforcement efforts on the most violent offenders and coordinates with locally based prevention and reentry programs to achieve lasting reductions in crime. At the end of the first year, violent crime in Lexington decreased by 13 percent, as compared to 2017. This decrease included declines in homicides by 21 percent, robberies by 21 percent, aggravated assaults by 11 percent, and shootings by 23 percent. Additionally, shots fired calls decreased by 9 percent.7

**Southern District of Mississippi** Throughout the past year, the U.S. Attorney’s Office has partnered with all levels of law enforcement, faith-based organizations, non-profits, neighborhood associations, and members of the community to reduce violent crime and make its neighborhoods safer for everyone. The violent crime rate in the City of Jackson fell 7 percent between December 2017 and December 2018. During this same period, there were 43 fewer carjackings (down 49 percent); 19 fewer rapes (down 17 percent) and 43 fewer armed robberies (down 9 percent).9

**Eastern District of Michigan** By utilizing available data and advances in technology, the PSN Task Force has been able to identify offenders who are driving violent crime rates in certain areas of Detroit. The district has also adopted a unified approach, working in partnership with a large community of stakeholders to reduce violent crime. In Detroit’s 8th Precinct, the PSN program’s target area, fatal and non-fatal shootings have continued a downward trend that began in 2017. The first six months of 2018 witnessed a 20 percent decline.8

**Eastern District of Virginia** In the PSN target areas in Richmond, through year end 2018, violent crime is down 22 percent, homicides are down 46 percent, aggravated assaults using firearms are down 44 percent, and robberies using firearms are down 20 percent. Citywide, through year end 2018, violent crime is down 8 percent, homicides are down 20 percent, aggravated assaults using firearms are down 12 percent, and robberies using firearms are down 44 percent.10

### PSN outside source

Andrew V. Papachristos, Northwestern University, [Tracey L. Meares](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tracey_Meares), Yale University, [Jeffrey Fagan](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jeffrey_Fagan), Columbia University, 7-1-2007, "(PDF) Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago," ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227618008\_Attention\_Felons\_Evaluating\_Project\_Safe\_Neighborhoods\_in\_Chicago

This research uses a quasi-experimental design to evaluate the impact of Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) initiatives on neighborhood-level crime rates in Chicago. Four interventions are analyzed: (1) increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, (2) the length of sentences associated with federal prosecutions, (3) supply-side firearm policing activities, and (4) social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through justice-style offender notification meetings. Using individual growth curve models and propensity scores to adjust for nonrandom group assignment of neighborhoods, our findings suggest that several PSN interventions are associated with greater declines of homicide in the treatment neighborhoods compared to the control neighborhoods. The largest effect is associated with the offender notification meetings that stress individual deterrence, normative change in offender behavior, and increasing views on legitimacy and procedural justice. Possible competing hypotheses and directions for individual-level analysis are also discussed.

### Project Safe Neighborhoods Reduces Violent Crime

National Institute of Justice, 6-11-2009, "Gun Violence Programs: Project Safe Neighborhoods," https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/gun-violence-programs-project-safe-neighborhoods

Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) is a nationwide program aimed at reducing gun violence in the United States.

**An NIJ-funded evaluation of the effectiveness of this major multiyear, multiagency crime prevention initiative found:**

* **Reduced violent crime overall in PSN cities; reductions were greater in cities with a high-level of federal prosecution.**
* A decline in gun-related violence in nine PSN cities that were studied in depth.
* Key factors for success included United States Attorneys Offices leadership, cross agency buy-in and the flexibility of the program to adjust to the realities of individual jurisdictions.

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| Cities (pop. > 100K) | Violent Crime Rate |
| With PSN (n =82) | -4.1% |
| Without PSN (n =170) | -0.9% |

Researchers analyzed violent crime statistics in cities with populations greater than 100,000. Comparing 82 PSN ("target") cities to 170 ("non-target") cities that did not implement PSN, they found a 4.1-percent decline in violent crime in cities where PSN was implemented compared to a 0.9-percent decline in cities where it was not.

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| Level of Federal Prosecution | Violent Crime Rate |
| High | -13.1 percent |
| Low | +7.8 percent |

The researchers also used crime statistics to analyze whether the level of PSN implementation — for example, the level of federal prosecution against gun crime — affected violent crime. They found a 13.1-percent decrease in violent crime in PSN target cities with a high level of federal prosecution. In stark contrast, during this same period of time, they found an increase of 7.8 percent in violent crime in nontarget cities in low federal prosecution districts.

Case Studies Show Reduction in Gun Violence

In their second evaluation strategy to determine if PSN worked, the researchers conducted in-depth analyses of nine target cities: Durham, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem (N.C.), Lowell (Mass.), St. Louis (Mo.), Chicago (Ill.), Stockton (Calif.), and Montgomery and Mobile (Ala.). In these individual case studies, the researchers were able to go beyond general violent crime statistics to specifically consider data on gun-related crime. Each of the nine sites showed a decline in gun-related violence after PSN was implemented. Here are the findings from six sites:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| City | Decline in Gun Crime |
| Chicago | Very significant decline in gun crime in police districts that implemented PSN compared to neighboring districts. |
| Stockton | Significant decline in gun crime compared to other California cities. |
| Mobile | Decline in admissions to the trauma center for gunshot wounds and a significant decline in gun crime compared to the trend in property crime. |
| Montgomery | Significant decline in gun crime compared to the trend in property crime. |
| Durham | Decline in gun violence, although it was not statistically significant. |

Key Success Factors for Preventing Violent Crime — Lessons Learned from Project Safe Neighborhoods

Project Safe Neighborhood is a nationwide program that NIJ-funded research has shown to be effective at reducing violence. Several factors emerged as key to PSN's impact on reducing violent crime.

* United States Attorney's Office leadership. The level of involvement among the country's 94 federal judicial districts varied widely; however, the researchers found that, in target cities where there were high levels of PSN implementation, there was a correspondingly high level of commitment by the United States Attorney's Office.
* Crossagency buy-in. The most successful PSN task forces showed what the researchers called “distributed leadership,” that is, active buy-in to the program among key agency leaders, such as the chief of police, the local prosecutor, the chief of probation and parole, and the mayor or city manager.
* Flexibility. PSN recognized that relying exclusively on increased federal gun prosecution would have limited value, since most gun crime is prosecuted in state and local courts. PSN also recognized that, because there are significant differences among U.S. communities in the level and nature of gun crime, the program needed to be able to adapt to the needs of each local jurisdiction. To allow jurisdictions maximum flexibility, PSN was built around five basic components:
  1. Partnerships: among law enforcement agencies, state and federal prosecutors, parole and probation agencies, and community groups (some of these partnerships resulted in joint case reviews, chronic violent offender lists, offender notification meetings and directed police patrols in hot spots).
  2. Strategic Planning: aimed at enforcement, prosecution, deterrence and prevention.
  3. Training: more than 17,000 PSN members had received training by 2005.
  4. Outreach: including "Hard Time for Gun Crime," a nationwide public service announcement campaign.
  5. Accountability: through various reporting mechanisms.

### PSN is predictive policing

General Rod J. Rosenstein, 12-5-2018, "Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the Project Safe Neighborhoods National Conference," No Publication, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-project-safe-neighborhoods

We also support “predictive policing,” which involves analyzing data so police can anticipate crime and preempt it. We need to send police to disrupt criminal activity in response to data analysis, instead of just dealing with the consequences after crimes occur.

In June, I visited Camden, New Jersey, to learn from Police Chief Scott Thomson how his department identifies potential hotspots and directs resources to cool them down. A few years ago, Camden was regularly listed among America’s most dangerous cities. But Chief Thomson rebuilt the department to focus on crime prevention. Murders in Camden declined by 70 percent, and violent crime fell by 39 percent.

Camden police use analysis, surveillance, and engagement to predict crime, and then they intervene to stop it. Chief Thomson will speak tomorrow about Camden’s programs. I hope his insights will inspire ideas that you can take back to your jurisdictions.

**New York and Los Angeles use similar predictive-policing approaches.**

**The NYPD monitors crime rates block-by-block.** I visited the Real-Time Crime Center at One Police Plaza in Manhattan last fall. When a violent crime occurs, the department reallocates officers immediately. That approach contributes to New York City’s remarkably low violent crime rate.

**And in Los Angeles, the LASER system uses real-time intelligence to identify the criminals most likely to reoffend.**

**Under the PSN model, we partner with local communities to prevent crime.** Across the country, we are making good on the PSN promise by working together to identify the most violent offenders, hold them accountable for their crimes, and prevent future violations through reentry and intervention initiatives.

The strategy works. Over the past year, federal prosecutors charged the greatest number of violent crime defendants since we started to track this category more than 25 years ago. The total surpassed the previous record by nearly 15 percent, and the previous record was just last year.

Meta-data show PP is good

Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy. “What is Hot Spots Policing?” 2016. JDN.

<https://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/research-evidencereview/hot-spots-policing/>

The evidence base for hot spots policing is particularly strong. As the National Research Council (2004: 250) review of police effectiveness noted, “studies that focused police resources on crime hot spots provided the strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available.” A Campbell systematic review by Braga et al. (2012) comes to a similar conclusion; although not every hot spots study has shown statistically significant findings, the vast majority of such studies have **20 of 25 tests from 19 experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations reported noteworthy crime or disorder reductions, suggesting that when police focus in on crime hot spots, they can have a significant beneficial impact on crime in these areas.**

6 cases where PP saved lives in New Delhi (total 9 lives and 15 arrested)

Times of India, "Delhi's tryst with predictive policing | Delhi News - Times of India", June 15, 2018, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/delhis-tryst-with-predictive-policing/articleshow/64598386.cms>

What is pre-crime It refers to law enforcement efforts and strategies to deter crime by predicting when and where [criminal activity](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/criminal-activity) will occur. Origin of pre-crime The term was coined in 1956 by [Philip K Dick](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Philip-K-Dick) in his science-fiction short story, The Minority Report 6 Cases where [science fiction](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/science-fiction) met reality

1. **June 12, 2018** PLOT | Man comes out on a one-week parole; plans to kill an industrialist (78) and his wife (75) apart from another [murder](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/murder-case) witness on the last day and return to jail. Discusses plan with girlfriend, cops arrest them hours before the murders. **Lives saved | 3 Arrested | 2** 2. **May 30, 2018** PLOT | Nursing attendant of an elderly couple aged 92 and 85 hatches a plot to kill them and rob their house on his last working day. Discusses plan with a weapon supplier, gets busted while en route to commit the murders. **Lives saved | 2 Arrested | 1 3. March 24, 2018** PLOT | D-Company’s men send shooters to kill Wasim Rizvi, president of Sunni Waqf Board. Special Cell manages to reach the spot in the nick of time and busts the plot. **Life saved | 1 Arrested | 5 4. Mar 7, 2018** PLOT | Cops avert the murder of a woman named Bhavna, a witness to a murder committed by a gang led by a criminal named Rocky **Life saved | 1 Arrested | 2 5. June 7, 2017** PLOT | On D-Company’s instructions, a local gang is at the end-stage of a plot to eliminate a Bajrang Dal activist to ignite communal tension; busted **Life saved | 1 Arrested | 3 6. Dec 9, 2017** PLOT | A gang arrives at a police station in northeast Delhi to gun down a rival who’s in custody. Tracking them, cell foils the plan **Life saved | 1 Arrested | 3**

Deterrent + How PredPol works

Issie Lapowsky, Wired, "How the LAPD Uses Data to Predict Crime", May 22, 2018, <https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/product-feature-predictive-policing-helps-law-enforcement-see-around-the-corners/>

In addition to LASER, the LAPD is also using a piece of software called PredPol to predict property crimes. It looks at the types of crimes that were committed in a given area, the time, and the location, and determines whether and when another crime is likely to occur there. PredPol then spits out maps, which are updated daily, marked with 500-by-500 foot hotspots that officers are strongly encouraged to patrol. “When you see more police officers, you see the lights, you hear the sirens, **the high visibility of officers does deter crime in certain areas,”** says Officer Steve Núñez, who has been with the LAPD’s Foothill division for 16 years. He argues that **just circling the block in some of these hotspots can serve as a deterrent in high-crime areas**.

Zach Friend, FBI LEB, "Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime — LEB", April 9, 2013, <https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/predictive-policing-using-technology-to-reduce-crime>

During the first 6 months of the program, the department made over 2 dozen arrests within the hot spot locations. However, the true measure of the program’s success is not apprehensions, but the reduction of crime. **Santa Cruz** police officers indicated an initial 11 percent reduction in burglaries and a 4 percent decrease in motor vehicle thefts. As time progresses, the reductions increase. **Over a 6-month period, burglaries declined 19 percent.** The system requires 6 months of data to assess whether the method actually is reducing the crime rate. **Because the Santa Cruz police did not introduce any additional variables**—no additional officers were hired, shift lengths continued, patrol structure remained the same—**the department attributed the crime reduction to the model. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) tested the method under a controlled experiment**. The project scientifically proved the model’s effectiveness. The city has a larger population and more complex patrol needs than Santa Cruz. Researchers established the experiment **in** the **Foothill** Division with a population of 300,000 people. They compared the predictive policing system with LAPD’s best practices. Similar to the Santa Cruz test, the department distributed maps to officers at the beginning of roll call. On some days analysts produced the maps using traditional LAPD hot spot methods. On other days, they used the algorithm. No one told the officers where the maps came from. Graphically they looked the same. The algorithm provided twice the accuracy that LAPD’s current practices produced. **While property crime was up .4 percent throughout Los Angeles, Foothill’s declined by 12 percent**. **Foothill benefitted from the largest crime reduction of any division during the experiment.**

Moreover, the Economist reported on May 5, 2018 that

The Economist, "Serve and predict - Violent crime is down in Chicago | United States | The Economist", May 5, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/05/05/violent-crime-is-down-in-chicago>

Policing software such as Predpol or HunchLab, their makers claim, is able to forecast where crime is likely to be committed. Certainly the numbers are intriguing. After **2016 turned out to be the deadliest year for two decades**, with 762 murders and 3,550 shootings, **the following year, which coincided with the establishment of the first SDSC, was less bloody**, with 650 murders and 2,785 shootings. The decline in crime in police districts with the new data centres was steeper than in those without. This could just have been reversion to the mean. But the Chicago police department thinks that HunchLab, the particular program it bought, has something to do with it. To see why this might be the case, **consider Englewood [Chicago]. A hard-up, predominantly black neighbourhood on the South Side, Englewood saw a decline in murders of 44% in 2017 compared with 2016. Shootings fell by 43%.** A byword for concentrated poverty, rampant crime, drugs, guns and gangs, Englewood seems to have taken everyone by surprise with its progress. Laura West, an officer working at the district’s SDSC, which is staffed by two officers at all times, spends her days surrounded by screens. One shows a program called ShotSpotter, which uses the sound of gunfire to pinpoint shootings; another shows where surveillance cameras are (the city has more than 40,000); and a third displays HunchLab software. This blends data on crime statistics, population density and weather patterns with fixed points such as liquor stores and highway exit-ramps, to identify patterns of crime that may repeat themselves. (Predictive policing software also takes into account the phases of the moon and the schedules of sports games.) At-risk sites are marked with boxes colour-coded according to the type of crime. Patrol officers are encouraged to check them frequently. **The key to Englewood’s improvement has not been more aggressive policing, says Kenneth Johnson, the district commander.** “We cannot arrest our way out of our problems,” he says. **Instead**, as he tells it, **the change is the result of targeted interventions**, combined with improved relations with the local community. The CPD’s relationship with black Chicagoans in particular has long been fraught. Its recent nadir was a white officer’s seemingly wanton firing of 16 bullets into Laquan McDonald, a black teenager, as he was walking away. The officer, Jason Van Dyke, who is about to be tried for first-degree murder, had been the subject of numerous complaints. Changing such a culture will take time. In Englewood, Mr Johnson tells his 350 officers to attend community meetings, to build relationships and to avoid behaving like an occupying force.

Zach Friend, FBI LEB, "Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime — LEB", April 9, 2013, <https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/predictive-policing-using-technology-to-reduce-crime>

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## Risk Assessment

Julia Angwin,Jeff Larson,Lauren Kirchner,Surya Mattu, 5-23-2016, "Machine Bias — ProPublica," ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

Proponents of risk scores argue they can be used to reduce the rate of incarceration. In 2002, Virginia became one of the first states to begin using a risk assessment tool in the sentencing of nonviolent felony offenders statewide. In 2014, Virginia judges using the tool sent nearly half of those defendants to alternatives to prison, according to a state sentencing commission report. Since 2005, the state’s prison population growth has slowed to 5 percent from a rate of 31 percent the previous decade.

In some jurisdictions, such as Napa County, California, the probation department uses risk assessments to suggest to the judge an appropriate probation or treatment plan for individuals being sentenced. Napa County Superior Court Judge Mark Boessenecker said he finds the recommendations helpful. “We have a dearth of good treatment programs, so filling a slot in a program with someone who doesn’t need it is foolish,” he said.